This can be useful if the DHCP server runs on the same server. On Linux,
the response is then sent via `lo`, so packets won't be received if both
sockets are bound to e.g. a bridge interface.
This reverts commit 84a3077e780e7b25bf536da42a583bdc18448362.
Support for dots in names of settings was removed quite a while ago and
now the \. sequence caused `SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence`.
Some servers might not support a length of 32 and return a malformed
request error. Lowering the value to the previous default of 16 could
help in that case.
The openxpki plugin directly access the certificates table in
the OpenXPKI's MariaDB in order to retrieve the status of an
issued X.509 certificate based on its serial number.
This allows preventing peers from authenticating with certificates
that are locally trusted, in particular, our own local certificate (which
safeguards against accidental reuse of certificates on multiple peers).
On the other hand, if this option is enabled, end-entity certificates
for peers can't be configured anymore explicitly (e.g. via remote.certs
in swanctl.conf).
Also simplify how we try to exceed the system-wide maximum. We basically
just try to force the value and simply fall back to the regular call.
The kernel actually won't let the latter fail if the value is too big,
it just caps it at the internal maximum.
This is currently only supported on Linux and with the appropriate
permissions.
Since it's experimental, it's disabled by default.
The log messages for each sent and received ESP message are logged in NET
like the ones in the socket-default plugin for UDP-encapsulated messages.
Before TLS 1.3, the server sent the last handshake message and had the
option to piggyback the EAP-Identity request directly onto the packet
with the TLS Finished message, or wait for the empty message by the
client that acknowledges the completion of the handshake. With TLS 1.3,
the client finishes the handshake after the server. So this option
is irrelevant there and we immediately start with Phase 2.
This allows NM more freedom in regards to how it wants to use the passed
device. In particular, if dnsmasq is used with NM as that binds to the
interface to send requests via VPN.
Installing the VIPs on lo avoids weird address removal/addition events
that happen for IPv6 on the physical interface (which would cause the VIP
to get incorrectly detected as non-VIP address and ignored during
deletion).
We could let NM install routes via XFRM interface, however, that causes
problems with e.g. the bypass-lan plugin (the throw routes in table 220
wouldn't have any effect). We could let it install regular routes in
the main table, but determining the physical interface would be tricky
as the routes installed by NM, also in the main table, would conflict.
So instead we let the kernel-netlink interface install routes via XFRM
interface and to avoid routing the IKE traffic that way, we set a mark
on the IKE socket and exclude traffic with that mark from our routing
table.
Since these might conflict with IKE traffic, this requires special care.
One option is to install bypass policies for the peer, which install
appropriate (throw) routes. However, that won't work if the traffic to
the gateway itself should be protected, in particular, for host-to-host
tunnels. So an alternative is to set a mark for the IKE socket and then
exclude that traffic from table 220 via the kernel-netlink plugin's
fwmark option.
If libcurl is built with MultiSSL support (not the case for e.g.
Debian/Ubuntu, which ship separate, conflicting libraries), this allows
selecting the SSL/TLS backend libcurl uses.
The resolvconf implementation provided by systemd via resolvectl strips
everything after the interface name, so each additional server that's
installed replaces the previous one. And even for other resolvconf
implementations installing them individually doesn't seem necessary as
we track and refcount them anyway.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#1353
Newer releases of systemd contain a change that removes not the part
after the first dot but the part after the last when determining the
interface name (apparently some interface names actually contain a dot).
This changes the default prefix to only contain one dot and avoids the
dots added by IPv4 addresses to create a unique interface/protocol for
each DNS server (it also replaces the `:` in IPv6 addresses with
something that might cause less conflicts).
References strongswan/strongswan#1353
Malicious servers could otherwise block the fetching thread indefinitely
after the initial TCP handshake (which has a default timeout of 10s
in the curl and winhttp plugins, the soup plugin actually has a default
overall timeout of 10s).
Some third party IKEv2 products expect an RSA-PSS ASN.1
algorithmIdentifier with an explicit trailerField value (CONTEXT3)
instead of the DEFAULT value if the trailerField is missing.
The setting charon.rsa_pss_trailerfield = yes enables the explicit
encoding.
These only apply to the usage reports that are available via
`stroke memusage`, not to leak reports when executables are terminated,
which always include all non-whitelisted leaks.
This should make the DoS limits (cookie_threshold[_ip] and block_threshold)
more accurate so that it won't be possible to create lots of jobs from
spoofed IP addresses before half-open IKE_SAs are actually created from
these jobs to enforce those limits.
Note that retransmits are tracked as half-open SAs until they are
processed/dismissed as the check only happens in checkout_by_message().
Increasing the count in process_message_job_create() avoids issues with
missing calls to track_init() before calling checkout_by_message() (e.g.
when processing fragmented IKEv1 messages, which are reinjected via a
process message job).
Because the global cookie threshold is higher than the per-IP block
threshold, it was previously possible for an attacker to block a legitimate
user by sending spoofed IKE_SA_INIT packets from that user's IP.
The timespan for requiring cookies is now also not extended anymore with
every IKE_SA_INIT received during the calm down period. Because this
allowed an attacker, after initially triggering the global cookie threshold,
to force cookies for all clients by sending just a single spoofed
IKE_SA_INIT every 10 seconds.
We keep track of reaching the per-IP threshold in segments of the hashed
IP addresses, so only a (random, due to chunk_hash()'s random key) subset
of clients will receive cookies, if single IPs are targeted.
The default global threshold is increased a bit.
strongSwan logs all syslog messages using LOG_INFO for historical reasons,
regardless of the strongSwan loglevel used producing the log message.
In some setups with advanced logging infrastructure, it may be feasible
to be more verbose when logging in strongSwan, but then filter messages
on the syslog server. While this may be possible by custom syslog filtering
rules matching the log level included with the log_level setting, this is
not super convenient.
So add a new map_level setting, which can map strongSwan loglevels to
syslog loglevels. By default this is disabled, keeping the existing
behavior. If enabled, it maps strongSwan loglevels to syslog loglevels
at a given syslog loglevel offset.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#859
RFC3779 requires to validate the addrblocks of issuer certificates strictly,
that is, they must contain the extension and the claimed addrblock, up to
the root CA.
When working with third party root CAs that do not have the extension,
this makes using the plugin impossible. So add a depth setting that limits
the number of issuer certificates to check bottom-up towards the root CA.
A depth value of 0 disables any issuer check, the default value of -1
checks all issuers in the chain, keeping the existing behavior.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#860
Using the trusted RSA or ECC Endorsement Key of the TPM 2.0 a
secure session is established via RSA public key encryption or
an ephemeral ECDH key exchange, respectively.
The session allows HMAC-based authenticated communication with
the TPM 2.0 and the exchanged parameters can be encrypted where
necessary to guarantee confidentiality.
We still require these algorithms for e.g. EAP-MSCHAPv2, so the option is
enabled, by default. To use other providers (e.g. fips or even custom
ones), the option can be disabled and the providers to load/activate can
be configured in openssl.cnf. For instance, the following has the same
effect as enabling the option:
openssl_conf = openssl_init
[openssl_init]
providers = providers
[providers]
default = activate
legacy = activate
[activate]
activate = yes
The default MTU of 1500 is too high if kernel-libipsec is used (considering
the overhead of UDP-encapsulated ESP), but might also have an effect if
a TUN device is only used to install a virtual IP (the route points to it,
so the system might use its MTU and 1500 would still be too high).
This also works around an issue on macOS 12 where no RTM_IFINFO event
is sent for the newly created TUN device (neither for the creation,
setting it "up", nor adding the address). Changing the MTU, however,
triggers such an event and we can detect the virtual IP.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#707
