Since we now open sockets for each address family independently (via
IPV6_V6ONLY) and without SO_REUSEADDR, it could happen with the previous
order on Linux that opening the port that was allocated as ephemeral
port for IPv6 was already used by a different process for IPv4.
Most IPv6 sockets on ephemeral ports will not have IPV6_V6ONLY set, so
the same port is also reserved for IPv4. Therefore, it's save to assume
that any ephemeral port we first get for IPv4 is free for IPv6.
References strongswan/strongswan#2494
This reverts commit 84a3077e780e7b25bf536da42a583bdc18448362.
Support for dots in names of settings was removed quite a while ago and
now the \. sequence caused `SyntaxWarning: invalid escape sequence`.
The order was different when not setting `esp_proposals` or explicitly
configuring `default`.
Fixes: 33412158f58c ("ike: Send AEAD ESP default proposal first")
Similar to the previous commit. Instead of
generating rule 10 (1258)
followed by (or not if the list is empty)
generating payload of type PROPOSAL_SUBSTRUCTURE
we now get
generating rule 10 LIST of PROPOSAL_SUBSTRUCTURE
in the debug log.
Instead of this
parsing rule 10 (1258)
we now see this
parsing rule 10 LIST of PROPOSAL_SUBSTRUCTURE
in the debug log. Particularly useful if the list is empty as there won't
be a message like this following it:
x bytes left, parsing recursively PROPOSAL_SUBSTRUCTURE
struct ifreq can't be used for IPv6 as the ifr_addr member is not large
enough. Actually, configuring an IPv6 address via an AF_INET socket won't
work anyway. And unfortunately, it's not standardized how IPv6 addresses
are installed, so we have to do this quite differently on Linux and on BSD.
However, we already use SIOCAIFADDR for IPv4 on newer FreeBSD systems,
which wasn't the case when this patch was originally created in 2014.
Consider queued child-creating tasks when reloading configs that have
`start` as start action. Besides some possible corner cases it fixes
handling IKE_SAs that are current getting established and have no
established CHILD_SAs yet.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2418
This is particularly important for IKE_SAs that are not yet established,
which would get terminated as they have no established CHILD_SAs yet.
Fixes: 72f9a21b22e9 ("Merge branch 'vici-reload-actions'")
The behavior of realloc(3) with zero size was apparently implementation
defined. While glibc documents the behavior as equivalent to free(3),
that might not apply to other C libraries. With C17, this behavior has
been deprecated, and with C23, the behavior is now undefined. It's also
why valgrind warns about this use.
Hence, when array_compress() would call realloc() with a zero size, we
now call free() explicitly and set the pointer to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Egerer <thomas.egerer@secunet.com>
Otherwise, all configs would be considered to even some degree as the
ports usually match.
Closesstrongswan/strongswan#2441
Fixes: 9228a5109b8d ("ike-cfg: Consider port information in IKE config match")
This adds support for multiple key exchanges (no KEMs yet as none are
standardized so far). Work on this started over five years ago and went
through multiple iterations (first our own protocol, then standardized
extensions in different variations).
IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges, defined RFC 9242, are used to transport
multiple KE payloads between the IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges.
To rekey IKE and CHILD_SAs with multiple key exchanges, IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
exchanges are used, as defined in RFC 9370.
In proposals, additional key exchange methods are configured via `keX_`
prefix, where X is a number between 1 and 7. For example, `ke1_ecp256`
adds ECP_256 as additional KE method. As with regular key exchanges,
peers have to agree on a method for each round unless no algorithms are
defined by both or `keX_none` is configured to make that round explicitly
optional.
Also changed is how rekey collisions are handled, which makes CHILD_SAs
properly trackable via child_rekey() hook.
Previously, it could happen that child_rekey() was triggered twice for
the same "old" SA. For listeners that would mean they'd loose track as
they'd be tracking a new SA that wasn't relevant anymore and for which
no updown event would ever get triggered (it was the redundant SA in a
collision). This new assert ensures that events are triggered in a
predictable way and listeners can track SAs properly.
As the winner of a rekey collision, we previously always triggered the
child_rekey() event once when creating the redundant SA on behalf of the
peer in the passive child-rekey task and then a second time when
creating the winning SA in the active task. However, both calls passed
the replaced CHILD_SA as "old". This made tracking CHILD_SAs impossible
because there was no transition from the redundant, "new" SA of the
first event to the "new", winning SA of the second. Of course, when the
second event was triggered, the redundant SA might not have existed
anymore because the peer is expected to delete it, which could happen
before the CREATE_CHILD_SA response arrives at the initiator.
This refactoring ensures that the child_rekey() event is triggered in
a way that makes the CHILD_SAs trackable in all reasonable (and even
some unreasonable) scenarios. The event is generally only triggered
once after installing the outbound SA for the new/winning CHILD_SA.
This can be when processing the CREATE_CHILD_SA in the active child-rekey
task, or when processing the DELETE for the old SA in a passive
child-delete task. There are some cases where the event is still
triggered twice, but it is now ensured that listeners can properly
transition to the winning SA.
Some corner cases are now also handled correctly, e.g. if a responder's
DELETE for the new CHILD_SA arrives before its CREATE_CHILD_SA response
that actually creates it on the initiator. Also handled properly are
responders of rekeyings that incorrectly send a DELETE for the old
CHILD_SA (previously this caused both, the new and the old SA, to get
deleted).
It also changes that payloads are built before installing the CHILD_SA
on the responder, that is, the KE payload is generated before keys are
derived, so that key_exchange_t::get_public_key() is called before
get_shared_secret(), or its internal equivalent, which could be relevant
for KE implementations that want to ensure that the key can't be
accessed again after the key derivation.
